(Not only if you get published, sell a record, or discover something new.)
He and I are at odds in one critical intersection of musings. He thinks reality must be "computable" and that only Godelian-complete "space" is allowed to be part of reality. He said straight up: Brian but formal languages are not mathematical objects.
Technically he said that Formal Systems aren't mathematical objects. That must be why he has it circumscribed by a red annulus.
Two things. Mathematical democracy and simpler theory compared to one in which only parallels which exist who meet certain strict criteria.
Formal systems, special cases of formal language, have the same ontological primacy as sets, strings, Neptune, and the HyperWebster which may be the context of any TOE. That means the hyperwebster is self similar and recursive (fractal).
The theory of formal languages indicates that formal language theory provides a type of model for classical set theory (i.e., ZF set theory). Thus sets are contingent upon them (and vice versa) for their existence.
So if Tegmark believes in a level 4 universe where mathematical structures are parallels equipped by the rules of the structure (in essence), that mathematical existence equals physical existence, then there are more general structures than the ones in set theory which represent parallels larger than he considers to exist.
Yet parallel UNIVERSES should be as all-inclusive as possible, and that's not to mention mathematical democracy, that all structures exist. Show the rules of formal languages to most mathematicians and I bet they would say it's no more or less a structure than groups... And if that caliber of peoples and organizations thinks formal systems (such as investigated by well known logician Raymond Smullyan) are mathematical objects.
For what it's worth, I think formal languages (hence, formal systems; the basis for his map of structure) are mathematical objects. This is not to mention that this way it obeys Occam's razor: the two theories have intersecting conclusions (reality is a mathematical structure), but mine doesn't arbitrarily discriminate as to whether they are "computable" which is rather anthrocentric.
So we have that (1) Formal languages are mathematical objects and (2) formal languages are more general than "computable structures." Computable structures would be a type of parallel but not a parallel universe. Give it a fancy name like quasi-parallel universe or quasi-parallel. Since formal languages encompass computable structures, they are more towards the Universe.
